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Abstract A bewildering number of proposals have
offered solutions to the privacy problems inherent in RFID
communication. This article tries to give an overview of
the currently discussed approaches and their attributes.
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1 Introduction
An April 2008 search for articles on RFID privacy and
security in Google Scholar1 yields over 700 titles, while
Gildas Avoine’s manually maintained RFID Security and
Privacy Bibliography [2] still lists as many as 214 publi-
cations on this topic since 2003. There certainly seems to
be no shortage of scholarly work in this area, yet a
‘‘solution’’ to these problems remains elusive. A June 2007
EU policy document [16] states that ‘‘effective action is
needed so Europeans can trust that the various applications
of RFID and related technologies are as safe, secure and
privacy-friendly as they possibly can be.’’
Why is the seemingly simple problem of securing the
readout of a relatively short numeric identification code
still unsolved? What issues still need to be addressed
before ‘‘safe, secure and privacy-friendly’’ RFID tags have
become a reality? This article attempts to summarize the
existing body of knowledge and identifies the issues and
shortcomings of today’s proposals.
2 Uses and threats
One problem that prevents a silver-bullet solution to RFID
privacy is certainly the wide range of applications and
technologies that the generic term ‘‘RFID’’ comprises.
Want [57] provides an excellent overview of the various
uses and technologies; Juels [29] offers valuable insights
into the security and privacy implications of these. For the
purpose of this article, we will focus on low-cost, battery-
less (passive) systems, as these will most likely have the
biggest impact on consumer privacy, due to their poten-
tially large numbers and low computational resources.
The basic feature of an RFID system is the automatic
identification of items [38]. In its simplest form, such
identification can be binary, e.g., paid or not paid, useful
for alerting. Modern tags allow hundreds of bits to be used
for such an ID, and standardization bodies such as EPC-
global have defined formats that allow for the automatic
resolution of these IDs into product information. With
multiple readers deployed, even unresolved IDs can still
offer monitoring capabilities by tracking the movements of
an item, e.g., goods in a manufacturing process. In contrast
to bar codes, RFID tags can additionally offer on-chip
computation, thus supporting cryptographic protocols for
authentication. Especially relevant for privacy is the fact
that these function can be accessed without a line-of-sight,
i.e., both reader and tag can be completely hidden from
view, making it difficult, if not impossible for the owners
of scanned objects to be aware of such a process taking
place.
All four of these RFID use cases—identification, alert-
ing, monitoring, and authentication—can be subverted by a
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specific type of attack. These attacks will be described in
the following subsections.
2.1 Authentication and Counterfeiting
RFID technology has its roots in the ‘‘identify friend or
foe’’ (IFF) systems for fighter planes in the second world
war [49], where non-forgeable identities were vital. Today,
RFID-based smart-cards are already in widespread use as
payment and travel systems (e.g., the Japanese SUICA card
or the Octopus card in Hong Kong), access control systems
(such as skipasses or car immobilizers), and most recently
as national and international identification documents.
Efforts are also underway to extend the identification
functionality of RFID tags to fight product counterfeiting
[53], in particular for medical drugs and luxury items such
as watches. In all cases, it is imperative that the authen-
ticity of RFID tags cannot be compromised.
While the mere use of RFID chips already complicates
the process of creating forged items, the widespread
availability of writable or even reprogrammable tags means
that the use of RFID alone does not offer enough protection
from determined counterfeiters. Westhues [59] built what
is practically an ‘‘RFID tape recorder’’, which could record
and play back replies from many commercial RFID-based
access control systems. Consequently, tags and readers
usually need to share a common secret and employ a
challenge-response protocol to verify each other’s knowl-
edge of the secret. Challenge-response protocols are a well-
known problem in security literature, and many strong
solutions exist. The particular challenge of RFID lies both
in the low computational power of the tags, as well as their
susceptabilty to physical attacks, implying that RFID
solutions must be both of low complexity and resistant to
pyhsical memory analysis [58].
While forged RFID tags certainly represent a security
problem, they are not in the focus of RFID privacy con-
cerns. Forged reader authentications, however, are much
more relevant, as the next section will show.
2.2 Identification and sniffing
The core RFID privacy problem is that of unauthorized tag
readout: with the help of wireless communication, third
parties can in principle read the tags of personal items from
large distances, and without any indication that such a
readout is taking place. Controlling access to tag data is
thus of prime importance.
By default, most RFID tags are indiscriminate: upon
entering a sufficiently powered reader field, they will reply
to any well-formed reader request with their full ID. With
standardized ID formats, such as EPCglobal’s tag data
specification [15], this ID can be resolved into a particular
application domain, a manufacturer, a product name, and
even a serial number. A typical concern is thus that
‘‘chatty’’ RFID tags disclose the posession of personal
items normally hidden from view, e.g., the brand of
underwear one is wearing, the presence of a wig or hip
replacement, or even a particular medicine one is carrying
[38]. When in 2003 the European Central Bank considered
the use of RFID tags in Banknotes [41], criminal scenarios
quickly surfaced in which clever robbers would screen
their victims first in order to assess the amount of cash
carried. Similar concerns surround the use of RFID in
travel documents, where a chatty passport might disclose
the citizenship of its bearer and thus allow the construction
of ‘‘smart bombs’’ that would only blow up if a worthwile
target passes by.
Clearly, this act of sniffing out the data on an RFID tag
can only be prevented if tags disclose their identitiy only to
authorized readers, i.e., those that are under the control of
the item owner or another authorized party. Authenticating
readers, or more generally speaking, the interrogating
party, is thus the primary technical issue for RFID privacy.
Furthermore, care must be taken that an unauthorized party
could not simply listen in to an unsecured communication
between a tag and a legitimate reader.
2.3 Monitoring and tracking
It is important to realize that privacy can also be violated
without actually identifying individual items. Once a spe-
cific tag or a set of tags can be associated with a particular
person, the mere presence of this tag in a particular reader
field already implies a (most likely unwanted) location
disclosure. Combining several such sightings across mul-
tiple logs can easily track a person over longer periods of
time. The fact that RFID tags are typically unique excer-
bates the problem, yet Weis [58] already noted that even
non-unique IDs can uniquely identify a person by virtue of
the particular constellation they are carried in.
To prevent such tracking, it is not sufficient to simply
scramble an ID to prevent the identification of an item—
tags must either frequently update their ID in a non-pre-
dictable (and preferably non-traceable) manner, or remain
completely silent upon inquiries from illegitimate readers.
The latter approach, while intuitively appealing, is difficult
in practice: in order to prove its authenticity to a particular
tag, a reader would need to know which tag to prove it to
(i.e., which secret to use in the authentication algorithm).
Without some sort of initial reply from the tag, this is
difficult.2
2 The alternative of using the same secret for all of its tags typically
lowers the strength of the authentication algorithm significantly.
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2.4 Alerting and denial of service
In its simplest form, an RFID tag simply announces its
presence, e.g., to an anti-theft gate in a bookstore. Sold
items get their embedded RFID tag killed at checkout so
that only unpaid items will be detected.
To completely alleviate privacy concerns of RFID tags, an
irreversible tag deactivation is necessary. Current industry
protocols like EPCglobal’s Class-1 Gen-2 [14] already
require compliant tags to offer a Kill-command that com-
pletely silences the tag once issued. As post-sales benefits of
tagged items increase (e.g., smart washing machines or
RFID-enabled returns), however, permanently disabling tags
might force the consumer to choose between privacy and the
convenience offered by novel RFID-based services. Tem-
porary silencing a tag (e.g., only between the supermarket to
the home, where it can be reactivated) might improve this,
yet incurs high password management costs [27], as reacti-
vation must necessarily be restricted to authorized readers
only. Such credentials would need to be passed on from
vendor to consumer, and potentially further on to other
family members or friends, for whom a certain item might
have been bought—a technical feat that would require
practically all point-of-sale-systems to seamlessly exchange
such data with just about any personal electronic device (e.g.,
a mobile phone or wireless smart card), and in turn with the
plethora of home-installed RFID systems and readers out
there. This assumes, of course, that all consumers would
carry and use such an electronic device in the first place.
The act of tag deactivation is typically in direct conflict
with commercial security concerns. If tags could be
silenced too easily, entire supply chains could be severely
disrupted by an attacker mounting a denial-of-service
attack, i.e., sending kill commands to passing trucks or
while strolling though supermarket aisles. A simple alu-
minium-foil lined bag is often enough to hide tagged items
in there in order to prevent an automated sales terminal
from picking up stolen goods; a personal jamming device
that would prevent readers from ‘‘coming through’’ might
work equally well.
3 Technical approaches to RFID privacy
Westin defines privacy as ‘‘the claim of individuals… to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extend
information about them is communicated to others’’ [60].
Sniffing and tracking RFID tags violates this control,
whether it involves actual data disclosure (in the form of
meaningful IDs) or simply presence indication (through
meaningless but trackable IDs).
There are certainly many ways of categorizing the var-
ious RFID privacy proposals under discussion today. Short
of killing tags at checkout, we can broadly distinguish
between two technical options:
• Hiding, Blocking: Tags are effectively silenced, either
by jamming the radio channel or by having them reply
only to readers that present proper credentials.
• Encrypting, Rewriting: Tag data is rendered meaning-
less to unauthorized readers. In order to prevent
tracking, even meaningless data must be updated
periodically.
The following sections will discuss the various solutions
discussed in the literature, with a particular focus on
deployment: If a solution requires costly rewritable tags, or
even the implementation of special crypto circuitry, the
odds of a large scale deployment of this approach diminish
rapidly. Solutions that can be readily implemented on
standard EPCglobal-conformant tags are particularly
appealing. Also the operational costs, i.e., the required
infrastructure for both vendors and consumers, and the
individual effort for using the system, must be taken into
account. Section 4 will then describe some further
deployment issues in more detail.
3.1 Hiding and blocking
Karjoth and Moskowitz [34] propose to physically clip tags
at checkout, using perforated tear-off antennas. Tags
remain functional, yet their range is effectively reduced to
few centimeters. While the technology has been commer-
cially licensed [54], its applicability is limited to items with
non-embedded tags. A proposal by Inoue and Yasuura [25]
suggests the use of two tags, with one tag holding the
unique serial number being peeled away at purchase time,
effectively reducing the granularity of the identification.3 A
number of vendors such as Emvelope Inc.4 have begun
selling aluminimum lined wallets and pouches for keeping
RFID-enabled credit cards and passports safe from
unwanted readouts.
For items that do not fit in pouches nor have detachable
labels, Juels et al. [32] proposed the so-called blocker-tag,
a simple RFID tag that overloads a reader’s anti-collission
protocol by answering to every single read request with a
jammed signal. While the blocker-tag could be manufac-
tured cheaply (as it is more or less a particularly
programmed RFID tag), its operation depends greatly on its
orientation: if misaligned, it could cease operating due to
lack of power from a reader’s field and thus expose all of
its blocked tags.
3 Note that such items could still be traceable as particular
constellations [58].
4 See http://www.emvelope.com.
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Rieback et al. [48] also point out that differential signal
analysis could differentiate between blocker-tag-only jam-
ming signals and those were both a blocker-tag and a real tag
reply. They instead propose a battery powered device, the
RFID Guardian [47], which not only produces a randomly
modulated jamming signal, but also allows the user to upload
access control lists indicating which party can perform what
operation on which tags.5 Sanjay Sarma, co-founder of
MIT’s Auto-ID center, has proposed a similar device called
the Vindictive Sentinel, albeit with a simpler configuration:
all valid readers would be registered and all others would be
blocked completely.6 Spiekermann [51] (in this volume)
calls this approach the ‘‘Agent Scheme’’ (see also Sect. 4.2
on the issue of ‘‘ownership transfer’’ below).
3.2 Rewriting and encryption
Encryption is often seen as the obvious solution for
securely controlling access to one’s tags. Juels rightly
refers to this as ‘‘siren song of encryption’’ [27]: This is
because many proposals ignore the practical problems of
key management, i.e., how the required keys for hundreds
of mundane objects such as underwear, DVD-cases,
chewing gum packs, or soft drinks could possibly be
securely and reliably exchanged between stores and their
customers, as well as consumers and their friends and
families. Consequently, encryption might only work well
in controlled systems such as payment cards and identifi-
cation systems, not with cheap everyday artifacts.
In its simplest form, cryptographically controlled access
was first proposed by Weis et al. [58] in the form of hash
locks: tag data is only released if the correct key is given,
which is stored in hashed form directly on the tag. This hash
value can be read out by any reader, yet only authorized ones
would be able to look up the tag’s key in a database of key-
hash pairs. Tags would be able to verify a key using an
integrated hash function that compares the key hash with the
stored hash value. While this protects the actual data on the
tag, Weis at al. realized that a static hash value would still be
traceable, and thus proposed an extension using random
values: Instead of simply sending their static hash value, tags
choose a random value r and send the pair (r, h(ID||r)) to the
reader, prompting the reader to brute-force search its
inventory for any ID that matches the given hash if concat-
enated with r [58].
Using randomized hash locks prevents readers from
tracking an unknown item, yet it also complicates the
reader’s search for the correct key. In practice, Weis et al.’s
scheme requires readers to sequentially search through its list
of tags. Many proposals exist to avoid such brute-force
searches, while keeping the untraceability property of
seemingly random tag replies. The general idea is to keep a
counter on both the tag and the reader loosely synchronized,
and include this value in tag replies. The reader can then keep
a few possible tag values for each tag, and update its database
whenever it successfully identified a tag. One of the first such
proposals was by Ohkubo et al. [45], who proposed to use
hash-chains and precompute m such tag outputs in a look-up
table. By limiting the length of hash-chains to m, readers
could store those efficiently. While this scheme provides
forward security,7 it is vulnerable to replay attacks [3].
Henrici and Mu¨ller [23] use a Dc in each tag that counts the
read attempts since the last successful reader authentication.
Sending Dc to readers eliminates the vulnerability of the
Ohkubo scheme to replay attacks, without hampering quick
authentication. Malicious readers may artificially inflate Dc
and thus be able to track a tag. Dimitriou [10] uses mutual
authentication of both tags and readers to limit ID updating,
thus keeping both readers and tags always in perfect syn-
chronization. If no authorized reader updates the tag value,
however, its value stays constant and can thus be tracked
again.
A different approach again is followed by Molnar and
Wagner [44], who propose a tree-based key-space: Tags do
not hold a single key, but a set of keys arranged in a tree.
Each tag stores all keys of a single particular path in the
tree, with authorized readers knowing all keys in the tree.
The reader can then use a challenge-response protocol to
step through the tree from its root to the leaves, checking
whether the tag in question contains a key, e.g., in the left
or the right part of the tree (in case of a binary tree). In
contrast to approaches using brute-force key spaces sear-
ches, this scheme offers logarithmic lookup properties.
This, however, comes at the expense of security, as tags
share large parts of the keyspace: if one or more tag-secrets
are compromised, the security of the remaining tags is
affected. This general idea has since been extended by
Buttyan et al. [6], Dimitriou [11], and Lu et al. [40], yet
tree-based approaches typically lack key-updating capa-
bilities due to their shared keyspace.
4 Practical issues for deployment
Hiding or encrypting a tag seems simple enough, yet when
implemented for hundreds of millions of tags, on a global
5 To allow for selective jamming, the RFID Guardian requires the use
of a deterministic protocol like ISO-15693, where tags reply in a pre-
defined timeslot (based on their ID) to reader requests.
6 See slides of his invited talk at http://events.iaik.tugraz.
at/RFIDSec06/Program/.
7 Forward security means that a compromised tag does not disclose
the entire history of tag sightings, even if these were under different
pseudonym IDs.
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scale, and involving complex flows of goods between man-
ufacturers, vendors, customers, and even the customers’
friends and families, simplicity in both implementation and
operation is of paramount importance. The following sec-
tions will describe the current work in both hardware
optimization (to minimize tag costs) and process optimiza-
tion (to simplify use of privacy mechanisms), in particular
the process of changing the ownership of a tagged item. Last
but not least, we will also report on policy solutions that are
meant to complement any deployed technical protection.
4.1 Cryptographic primitives
A large body of work in RFID privacy is concerned with
lowering the requirements for cryptographic functions
implemented on RFID hardware, such as the work by
Feldhofer et al. [18] on using AES or the use of elliptic
curve cryptography [4]. Some researchers target the limited
hardware capabilities of standard EPCglobal-tags, provid-
ing algorithms that only rely on simple XOR operations
[35] or the presence of a random number generator [8, 55].
Juels [26] points out that typical attack models need to be
significantly relaxed in real-world RFID environments, as
adversaries typically do not have 24/7-access to a tag, but
rather minutes or seconds. Juels argues that a simple list of
pseudonyms that cycles to a new ID upon every read request
might be sufficient in many cases. By limiting the number of
IDs that can be read out, an attacker has a much lower
probability of re-encountering an ID. At the same time, the
attacker is unable to resolve the (random) pseudonym, thus
protecting the tag from both tracking and identification
attacks. While certainly cheap to implement on a tag, Juels’
scheme still requires the exchange of lookup tables to allow
legitimate readers the resolving of pseudonyms.
An interesting avenue of research was initiated by Juels’
and Weis’ HB?-protocol [33], which is a probabilistic
algorithm that can be used to both authenticate a tag to a
reader and to hide the real ID of a tag to an eavesdropper.
In the HB?-protocol, both reader and tag share a common
k-bit secret x, which allows the tag to compute the binary
inner product z = x  a for a k-bit challenge a sent by the
reader. However, instead of directly replying with the
result z, the tag injects noise into its response with a con-
stant probability p B 0.5. By repeating this challenge-
response protocol for r rounds, the reader can identify/
authenticate the tag if fewer than pr of its responses fit a
particular secret x. An attacker, on the other hand, is unable
to learn the secret due to the presence of noise.8 The HB?-
protocol only requires simple bitwise AND and XOR
operations on the tag. In a similar fashion, Castelluccia and
Soos [7] propose a probabilistic approach that has a tag
reply with a random subset of L indexes from its key x
(e.g., ‘‘1; 6; 5; 2’’ for a 6-bit key), together with a bitstring
a that complements this subset in such a way that the
binary inner product z = x a = L/2. By repeatedly sending
both indexes and complementing bitstrings, the reader can
compute z for each of its known secrets and successively
eliminate keys where z= L/2. As in the HB?-protocol, an
attacker needs to solve an NP-hard problem, while tags
need only simple AND and XOR operations.
While work on cryptographic primitives is central to
bringing strong cryptography to lower-powered and cheap
RFID hardware, this generally does not change the central
issues of pseudonym updates, key distribution, and own-
ership transfer, as described in the following subsection.
4.2 Supporting ownership transfer
Of particular interest to any real-world deployment of
RFID encryption are approaches that specifically attempt
to simplify ownership transfer, i.e., updating the key of an
RFID tag in such a way that a prior owner of a tagged
item (e.g., the supermarket) cannot read the tag after the
item has been given to a new owner. Early suggestions by
Inoue and Yasuura [25] simply replaced the original tag
ID with a Private ID that allowed the new tag owner to
look up the original value in a private database. As this
approach does not take tracking or rewriting attacks into
account, reader authentication and dynamic pseudonym
changes were introduced, e.g., in the work Osaka et al.
[46]. Common to this and other approaches is the need for
a Trusted Center that holds the actual information about
the tag (i.e., its ID or details about the tagged goods),
which authenticated readers can query for an encountered
tag pseudonym in order to receive the true tag ID. Molnar
et al. [43] extended the tree-based approach by Molnar
and Wagner [44] with a delegation model that allows a
trusted center to store key-subtrees on a trusted reader,
thus eliminating the need for reader online access. Each
subtree supports a specific number of tag identifications,
say, 1,000 times. If tag ownership changes, the new
owner needs to notify the trusted center that previous
readers are not authorized to access tag data anymore. If
the trusted center already delegated a key-subtree, the
new owner can simply ‘‘fast forward’’ the tag’s keyspace
by reading it repeatedly until the set of delegated keys has
been exhausted (thus rendering the delegated subtree
useless).
Spiekermann et al. [5, 52] advocate the mandatory use
of hash-locks at supermarket checkouts, using a con-
sumer-chosen ‘‘RFID-password.’’ To facilitate password
management, the authors envision a smart consumer
device (‘‘data-protection card’’, e.g., a future mobile
8 This is known as the Learning Parity in the Presence of Noise
(LPN) Problem.
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phone) that ‘‘takes over’’ the tags at checkout or at a
separate deactivation station.9 To simplify operations,
only a single password for all items could be used, thus
further alleviating the need for a consumer-maintained
database. Given the often minimal value and short life-
time of supermarket items, the authors argue against
burdening the process with strong security precautions.
The main strength of this work lies in providing a
roadmap for retail-based RFID use, yet it remains to be
seen how realistic a comprehensive deployment of such
‘‘data-protection’’ devices is. The authors also focus
primarily on supermarket environments, even though
tagged chewing gums, soda cans, and ice cream cones
might also be sold at small newsstands and through
street hawkers—situations where no sophisticated point-
of-sales terminals for tag reprogramming would be
available.
4.3 Keyless approaches
As an alternative to blocking and encryption approaches,
Fishkin et al. [19] proposed the use of signal strength-mea-
surements directly on the tag, in order to assess the distance
between a tag and its reader. Following the general principle
of ‘‘distance implies distrust’’, the authors propose several
disclosure levels: no replies to far away readers, presence
(e.g., a single bit) to closer ones, product IDs for close-by
readers, and unique serial for near contact. While elegant in
principle, both the problem of performing reliable mea-
surements on low-cost RFID hardware, as well as the
difficult predictability of the disclosure policy (how close is
‘‘very close’’?) render the proposal difficult in practice.
Langheinrich and Marti [39] extend Juels ‘‘minimalist
cryptography’’ described above with bit-throttling and
shared secrets, effectively wrapping the tag data into sev-
eral encryption layers that require continuous read access
for significant amounts of time. Based on Adi Shamir’s
theory of shared secrets [50], the tag’s real ID is encoded
into several pieces (shares). The ID can only be recon-
structed if enough of those pieces are known. While all
pieces are stored on the same tag, readout is complicated
by allowing only a random trickle of bits from the tag.
Together with a short read range, this requires an attacker
to spend a considerable amount of time in close proximity
to the ‘‘target’’, making quick unnoticeable readouts diffi-
cult. At the same time, however, legitimate owners are able
to use simple caching strategies to identify their items
instantaneously, as an initial burst of disclosed bits is
enough to probabilistically identify a tag from a known set.
In order to prevent the repeated querying of such a larger
initial subset, which would give an attacker faster access to
the entire key, tags use random temporary IDs for tag
singularization, thus making it more difficult for an
attacker to correlate two such bitstrings across consecutive
queries. Juels et al. [31] have leveraged this approach to
effectively distribute keys along the supply chain. As a side
effect, they advocate that sold items remain locked with
this password, in order to prevent unauthorized readouts
(effectively prohibiting post-sales consumer services,
except through the original merchant). However, they do
not address how to prevent the unauthorized tracking of
static identifiers described in Sect. 3.2 above.
4.4 Policy controls
Many authors have noted that RFID reading does not
happen in a legal vacuum. Readers are physical devices
that emit significant amounts of radiation—attacks on
RFID tags are thus much more difficult to hide than, say,
server attacks on the Internet.
Floerkemeier et al. [20] propose the use of ‘‘transparency
protocols’’ directly within RFID standards, requiring readers
to explicitly state their operators, data collectors, collection
purpose, and data recipients. This would at the very least
allow consumer interest groups and privacy commissioners
to inspect and verify (audit) the proper operation of such
systems. In addition, interested users might carry personal
devices able to read such statements (so-called ‘‘watchdog
tags’’) and keep personal data disclosure logs or even control
access to personal tags. A similar approach is proposed by
Juels and Brainard [30], who call this device a tag privacy
agent (TaPA). Molnar, Soppera, and Wagner [42] propose to
build reader devices around a trusted computing module and
thus receive an auditable attestation about the proper func-
tioning of each reader.
Kriplean et al. [37] focus on access to collected RFID
data and propose the concept of physical access control
(PAC) as an alternative to complex access policies. With
PAC, the system distinguishes between users and objects
and allows authenticated users access to all object and user
sightings that were ‘‘visible’’ to them, i.e., RFID readouts
that happened in the (visible) vicinity of where their per-
sonal user tag had been at the time (based on a map of
installed readers). To prevent ‘‘misplacing’’ one’s user tag
among someone elses belongings (thus claiming to be
always co-located with that person, which in PUC would
grant an attacker access to all activities of that person), the
authors propose a number of alert and feedback methods,
such as an elevator that would announce the number of
user tags present, in order to allow spotting such attacks.
Note that Kriplean et al. assume a trusted infrastructure and
do not address protection from unauthorized readers.
9 Until such devices are available, the authors propose that new
random passwords would be assigned by the supermarket and printed
on the receipt.
418 Pers Ubiquit Comput (2009) 13:413–421
123
5 Summary and outlook
Much work in RFID privacy is concerned with secure and
efficient cryptographic algorithms. This, however, does
only address a fraction of the issues encountered in real-
world RFID system. As most of today’s proposals require a
shared secret between readers and tags, they are difficult to
deploy in a general consumer setting. Given the gaping
security holes [24] in many deployed RFID-based appli-
cations such as RFID-credit cards and ePassports, however,
research in RFID security is nevertheless timely and highly
relevant (also with regards to counterfeiting and cloning,
e.g., see [28, 56]).
In order to ‘‘solve’’ the privacy problem for the count-
less smart shopping scenarios, much more is needed than a
cryptographic protocol. Unless key management is signif-
icantly simplified, only keyless approaches seem to stand a
chance of success. Similarly, any such solution requires
strong regulatory support, either in the form of active self-
regulation [21] or effective legal enforcement of existing
laws [9]. The current activities at the European policy level
[12, 13], including the public consultations during March
and April 2008,10 are expected to lead to additional legal
instruments, requiring, e.g., operators to conduct privacy
impact assessments (PIA) prior to deployment and ensuring
the use of up-to-date information security measures in their
systems.
Fabian et al. [17] point out that much of the RFID pri-
vacy problem might actually lurk in the backend of the
envisioned EPC information infrastructure: instead of
bothering with localized attacks using deployed readers,
smart attackers might simply eavesdrop on the generated
(unsecured) traffic in backend systems to track unsuspect-
ing consumers. Last but not least, the scope of the
envisioned data collections will most certainly require
equally large efforts in areas of privacy databases [1] and
profile management [36] to be complete.
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